This article introduces the study of frame choice in negotiation. Here, the selection of a procedural frame is treated as a dependent variable-a choice that bargainers make in addition to determining their offers. The empirical focus of the article is on whether, when given a choice between two alternative versions of the ultimatum bargaining game, negotiators choose the description that maximizes their expected payoffs. For example, in one framechoice task, negotiators assigned to the Player 1 role were asked to select between framing the game as "Player 1 proposes a division and Player 2 accepts or rejects it" or "Player 1 makes a claim from a common pool and Player 2 makes a counterclaim." Past research has shown that the second frame leads to higher expected payoffs for Player 1 than does the first. Across four studies and three established framing effects, it is found that participants consistently fail to select the procedural frames that optimize monetary outcomes. Subsequent analyses suggest that this tendency is due to two factors: (a) nonmonetary motivations, such as fairness and respect, that influence frame-choice preferences and (b) cognitive limitations that inhibit the ability to accurately predict the effect of alternative procedural frames on opponents' responses. ᭧
whether the task is to accept a preferred outcome versus reject a nonpreferred one (Shafir, 1993) . Differences in elicitation and framing have been shown to alter preferences from risk averse to risk seeking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) , from positive time discounting to negative time discounting (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993) , and reverse preferences across multiattribute outcomes (Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988) . Individual-level results have also been applied to interpersonal bargaining contexts (Neale & Bazerman, 1991) . Consider, for example, Bazerman, Magliozzi, and Neale (1985) , who have shown that bargainers tend to make more concessions when their outcomes are defined in terms of net profit (a gain frame) than in terms of reductions in gross profit (a loss frame).
Traditionally, framing and elicitation have been studied as independent variables in between-participant designs. Many different kinds of effects have been documented in the behavioral decision and negotiation literatures (for reviews, see Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998; Camerer, 1995; Neale & Bazerman, 1991) as well as in the attitude-change literature (Cialdini, 1988; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993 ). An implicit concern in this research is that framing effects discovered in the laboratory could also arise in natural settings and be used to influence decision making [for example, in areas such as consumer advertising (Nowlis & Simonson, 1997) and politics (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997) ]. Yet, little or no research has addressed the task of frame choice. In frame choice, the decision maker selects the frame that will be presented to a second party, who then makes a decision based on that frame. Our goal in this article is to initiate the study of frame choice in negotiations.
In most naturally occurring negotiations, bargainers interact by taking turns receiving and communicating messages, usually in the form of offers (Putnam, 1982) . When communicating one's own offer, a bargainer must choose not only his or her preferred outcome, but also how to verbally frame it for the other party. In these settings, framing becomes a dependent variable, and the act of framing a means of social influence. Consider a seller negotiating over the purchase of a used car that is listed at $3600. The buyer opens with an offer of $2900 and moves to $3000. The seller now wants to counter with $3500. In presenting his or her counteroffer, the seller may ponder whether to state his or her newest offer as "How about $3500?," "I'm willing to decrease my offer by $100," or, alternatively, "You've moved in by $100, so I'll match that." In each case, the offer is the same, $3500. What changes is whether that offer is framed as an absolute value, an incremental adjustment, or an act of reciprocation.
Thus, the impetus for the current article is to begin studying frame choice as a dependent variable in interpersonal bargaining-a behavioral choice that a bargainer can make in addition to determining the value of his or her offer. We believe that framing effects may play an important role as tools of influence in social interaction. Thus, to be relevant, framing research must be considered not only as a between-participant variable imposed by the environment (e.g., an experimenter in a psychology lab), but as a potential within-participant choice used by self-interested bargainers to influence social interactions. FRAME CHOICE IN BARGAINING 45 Yet, moving the study of framing from an independent to a dependent-variable paradigm is a daunting task, given the almost unlimited array of linguistic options available to bargainers seeking to frame messages. To make the framechoice task tractable, we use a two-player, single-issue distributive exercise, where the only goal is to divide surplus. By doing this, we preclude other goals in negotiation, such as relationship building and integrative bargaining (Thompson, 1990) . The specific exercise is the ultimatum bargaining game depicted in Fig. 1 , in which two players divide a fixed amount of money in two moves. Player 1 makes an offer, and Player 2 can accept or reject it. This game offers many benefits. The structure is sparse; the research literature on this game is well-developed (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982; see Thaler, 1988, and Roth, 1995 , for reviews); and multiple between-partcipant framing effects have been identified (e.g., Blount & Bazerman, 1996; Larrick & Blount, 1997) .
In Studies 1 and 2, we start with the game theoretic assumption that bargainers are profit maximizers and that frame choice should be motivated by monetary concerns. We then study how bargainers select among two alternative frames to improve their outcomes. In Study 3, we relax the assumption of profit maximization to study how alternative motivations, such as fairness (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986) , may also affect frame choice. In Study 4, we stay in the ultimatum game setting, but expand to look at two different frame-choice tasks. Our goal across all four studies is to begin to examine how bargainers seek to strategically elicit opponents' responses. We address two questions: Are bargainers successful at choosing bargaining frames that maximize their payoffs? What other motivations besides profit maximization guide frame choice?
Framing in Distributive Bargaining
We begin by identifying two types of framing that can arise in distributive bargaining. We term these outcome framing and procedural framing (Larrick & Blount, 1997) . We know from existing research that one avenue of verbal influence available to bargainers involves how the outcome itself is describedfor example, in terms of gains versus losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) or using alternative labels which may evoke differences in valuation, such as labeling something as a gamble versus the purchase of insurance (Hershey, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1982) . Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth (1998) recently proposed a typology of framing effects. Our use of the term outcome framing incorporates both risky choice and attribute framing, and most elements of goal framing, as identified in their typology. In any one of these categories, framing effects are achieved by changing how offers are described. Multiple 
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BLOUNT AND LARRICK researchers have documented the effect of alternative outcome frames on negotiated outcomes in between-participant designs (e.g., deDreu, Carnevale, Emans, & van de Vliert, 1994; deDreu, Emans, & van de Vliert, 1992; Lim & Carnevale, 1995; Olekans & Frey, 1994) .
Another avenue of verbal influence in distributive bargaining involves how the procedures that the players enact are framed. Here, what changes is how individual players' actions are described; these changes in description have been found to invite different interpretations of the game and may alter players' choices (Larrick & Blount, 1997) . As an example, Brewer and Kramer (1986) compared participants in social dilemmas who could take up to 25 points from a common pool with participants who first received 25 points and could choose how much to give back. While these games are structurally equivalent, and in each case the outcomes were similarly framed, Brewer and Kramer found that the taking action frame led to more cooperation than the giving back action frame. We refer to this as procedural framing.
Recent work has begun to examine the effects of alternative procedural frames on negotiated outcomes (e.g., Allison, Beggan, & Midgely, 1996; Messick, 1998) . Consider our work on framing across two alternative versions of the ultimatum bargaining game (Larrick & Blount, 1997) . First, the "accept/ reject" version:
There are two players and a joint pool of $7.00. Player 1 goes first and proposes a division of the money between the two players. Player 2 can then accept or reject Player 1's proposal. If Player 2 accepts, both receive the amount that Player 1 proposed. If Player 2 rejects, neither player gets anything. Second, the "claim" version:
There are two players and a joint pool of $7.00. Player 1 goes first and states how much of the pool he will claim for himself. Knowing Player 1's claim, Player 2 then states a claim for herself. If the total of the two claims is equal to or less than the total pool of $7.00, both receive the amount they claimed. If the total exceeds the pool, neither player gets anything.
While the two frames have equivalent structures (assuming subgame perfect responses), we have shown across several studies that players in both positions behave more generously in the "claim" frame than in the "accept/reject" frame. As an example, in our first study of 105 participants (Larrick & Blount, 1997) , we found that 30% of Player 2s in the claim version stated a willingness to accept $0 and allow Player 1 to claim all $7.00. Only 2% of participants in the accept/reject version were willing to accept an equivalent outcome. Further, 56% of Player 1s offered an even split or better to Player 2 in the claim version. Similar offers occurred only 37% of the time in the accept/reject version.
In Larrick and Blount (1997) , we explored several differences between the two frames to determine what drove these effects. These included (a) how Player 1's action is framed: in the accept/reject game, Player 1 proposes a division between the two parties; in the claim version, Player 1 makes a claim only for himself; (b) how Player 2's action is framed: in the accept/reject game, Player 2 accepts or rejects Player 1's proposal; in the claim version, Player 2 makes a claim for herself; and (c) the relative symmetry of the two players' actions: in the accept/reject game, the two players take different actions; in the claim version, the two players take the same action. Through that research, we isolated that the behavioral difference was due to how Player 2's response was framed. We found that, controlling for Player 1's behavior (using either game frame), the changes in both Player 1 and Player 2 behaviors occurred when Player 2's action was framed as a claim rather than as an accept/reject decision.
Further, the Larrick and Blount (1997) findings suggested that Player 1s were more generous in the claim frame because they inaccurately expected that Player 2s would be more demanding in that frame. Consider Study 4, where Player 1 participants were asked to provide data about the proportion of Player 2 participants that they thought would be willing to allow various allocations. These were: ($7.00/$0.00,), ($6.50/$0.50), ($5.50/$1.50), ($4.50/ $2.50), and ($3.50/$3.50). Player 1 expectations in the accept/reject condition were reasonably accurate. Participants correctly predicted that almost no Player 2s would accept ($7.00/$0.00), 50% would accept ($4.50/2.50), and about 90% would accept ($3.50/3.50). However, Player 1's expectations in the claim condition were inaccurate and pessimistic. Here, participants believed that almost no Player 2s would allow ($7.00/$0.00), only 30% would allow ($4.50/ $2.50), and only 70% would allow ($3.50/$3.50). The true percentages were 30, 80, and 100%, respectively. Larrick and Blount (1997) explained these misestimates as the product of incorrect naïve theories about power and control in bargaining. Specifically, Player 1s believed that the open-ended response in the claim frame gave Player 2 too much independence and made them too unpredictable, whereas the simple, discrete choice between accept and reject made Player 2 more dependent and predictable. While this reasoning may or may not be valid it is wrong in this particular application.
In the current article we start where Larrick and Blount (1997) left off. Namely, we begin to examine some of the implications of the "claiming effect," i.e., the fact that players in both positions behave more generously in the claim frame than in the accept/reject frame. The Player 2 finding clearly reveals that alternative decision frames, such as the claim versus accept/reject frames, influence how bargainers respond to offers. However, the Player 1 finding is even more interesting, because it suggests that alternative decision frames may also introduce bias into how bargainers prospectively predict opponents' responses.
These prospective biases could have two important effects on bargainer behavior. First, they could affect what offer the bargainer puts on the table within a particular frame, as was observed in Larrick and Blount (1997) . Second, they could affect frame choice. That is, if given a choice between alternative frames, biases in predicting opponent's responses could lead bargainers to make suboptimal choices. Logically, people should choose the frame that maximizes the likelihood of attaining their preferred outcome. Yet, in some settings, they may erroneously believe that procedural frame A is more likely to yield success than frame B, when, in fact, the opposite may be true. It is this second-order effect, the frame-choice effect, that we examine in the current article. 
STUDY 1
Our central theme in this article is that traditional laboratory bargaining games "fix" the frame for participants, thereby omitting a critical bargaining decision: how to frame bargaining procedures and outcomes for opponents. Study 1 was designed to test whether Player 1 and Player 2 participants could, in fact, use framing to maximize their payoffs in the ultimatum game. We did this by adding a third move at the beginning of the game depicted in Fig. 1 . Prior to Player 1 making an offer about how to split the money, we asked either Player 1 (Fig. 2) or Player 2 (Fig. 3) to select between the claim versus accept/ reject frames described above.
For the Player 1 role, we told participants that their goal was to receive as large a payoff as possible and that their role would consist of two parts. First, they had to select the claim or accept/reject version; second, they had to specify their action within their chosen game frame. Our earlier research has shown that the claim version is more lucrative for Player 1 than the accept/reject frame, although Player 1 has the opposite perception. Our prediction based on these findings was that Player 1 participants would erroneously prefer the accept/reject frame over the claim frame.
For the Player 2 role, we told participants that their goal was to receive as large a payoff as possible from Player 1 and that their role would consist of two parts. First, they had to select a game version. Then, they had to specify their action within their chosen game frame. In selecting a frame, they chose simultaneously how Player 1's offer and their own response would be framed. Our previous results have found that the claim frame is more lucrative for Player 2 than the accept/reject frame, but our earlier findings do not suggest which frame Player 2s would prefer.
Method
Participants. One hundred forty masters of business administration (MBA) students participating in four different classes on negotiations at the University   FIG. 3 . Three-stage ultimatum game where Player 2 chooses game frame prior to play. FRAME CHOICE IN BARGAINING 49 of Chicago voluntarily participated in this exercise. They were handed a onepage (Player 1 role) or two-page (Player 2 role) questionnaire and given approximately 10 min to complete the exercise. The exercise was debriefed, and payments were distributed in a subsequent class. All participants were paid based on their outcomes.
Materials.
Half of the participants were given a one-page text entitled "Resource Allocation Exercise-Player 1 Role." It explained that they would be randomly and anonymously paired with another student to participate in a resource allocation game. In this game, there would be a potential pool of $7.00 and two roles, Player 1 and Player 2. The players would play for real money, which would be supplied by the experimenters, and they would play only once. They were then told that they had been randomly assigned to the Player 1 role and there were two versions of this game. It was explicitly stated, "You get to choose which version you and Player 2 will play. Player 2 will not be informed that you have made this choice. They will simply be presented with the version that you select." Finally, participants were told, "Your goal for this exercise is to get as large a payoff for yourself as possible." After reading descriptions of the two versions, participants chose between them by checking either: " I select Game A. I claim $ for me," or " I select Game B. My offer is $ for me, $ for Player 2." The two versions of the game were described as follows:
A: Player 1 will state a claim for some portion of the $7.00, such as $X. Then, knowing $X, Player 2 will be asked to state his/her claim for some portion of the $7.00, let's say $Y. If the total of the two claims ($X ϩ $Y) is equal to or less than $7.00, each player will get the amount he/she claimed. If the total is more than $7.00, neither student will receive any money.
B:
Player 1 will propose a division of $7.00 between the two players, such as $X for Player 1 and ($7 Ϫ X) for Player 2. Then, Player 2 will be asked whether he/she accepts or rejects this proposal. If Player 2 accepts the proposal, each player will get the amount Player 1 proposed. If Player 2 rejects the proposal, neither student will receive any money.
The other half of participants were given a two-page text entitled "Resource Allocation Exercise-Player 2 Role." The first page was very similar to that used for Player 1, except that Player 2 participants were told "Your goal for this exercise is to get as large an offer from Player 1 as possible." In the Player 2 role, only the game version was selected at the bottom of the first page. Behavioral responses were selected on the next page. For both roles, the ordering of the two frames as A or B was counterbalanced across participants.
On page 2, Player 2 participants were presented with a checklist of every possible division of money (in $.50 increments) for both frames. They were instructed to fill out the responses just for the game version that they had chosen. For the claim frame, the instructions read "If Player 1 claims," and then listed each possible division beginning with "$7.00 for Player 1, which leaves $0.00 for Player 2" and increasing by $.50 increments to "$0.00 for Player 1, which leaves $7.00 for Player 2." Participants responded separately to each claim by completing the phrase: "I will claim $ for me." In the ultimatum frame, responses were elicited for each possible division using the phrase: "I will accept, reject."
Results
Frame choice. When given a choice, Player 1 participants strongly preferred the accept/reject frame. Forty-two of 65 (65%) chose this frame (versus 50%, 2 (df ϭ 1) ϭ 5.55, p Ͻ .02). A significant proportion of Player 2 participants also preferred the accept/reject frame. Forty-six of 75 (61%) Player 2 participants chose the accept/reject frame (versus 50%, 2 (df ϭ 1) ϭ 3.85, p ϭ .05). The order of the game descriptions had no effect on choice.
Average requests and acceptable offers. On average, Player 1 participants requested $4.28 when they selected the claim frame and $4.56 when they selected the accept/reject frame (ns). The corresponding minimum acceptable outcomes for Player 2 participants were $1.40 and $1.80 (ns). These requests were higher than the requests normally observed in the claim and accept/reject frames. For example, in a study of the same population in which participants were randomly assigned to a role and a frame, the four amounts were $3.83, $4.07, $1.19, and $1.58, respectively (Larrick & Blount, 1997 , Study 4, n ϭ 304). Comparing the current study with this prior study, a frame (accept/reject vs claim) ϫ role (Player 1 vs Player 2) ϫ frame choice (chosen frame vs assigned frame) ANOVA was conducted on the average amounts requested across both studies. A main effect for frame choice was found. The average amounts requested across both roles in the current study (M ϭ $3.02) were significantly higher than the amounts requested after random assignment in our earlier study (M ϭ $2.67), (F(1, 432) ϭ 6.97, p Ͻ .01). There were no significant effects involving the other two variables.
Discussion
The results of this first study suggest that, for at least one type of frame choice, profit-motivated bargainers may choose frames suboptimally. In our expanded version of the ultimatum bargaining game, participants in the Player 1 position erroneously preferred the less profitable accept/reject frame. Participants in the Player 2 position also preferred this frame, although our previous research suggests that they, too, could have been better off had they selected the claim frame.
The results also find that the act of choosing a frame leads to less generous behavior. In the current study, participants in both roles requested significantly more money than comparable participants playing the same exercises, but who were not given a frame choice. This effect occurred independent of framechoice preference and is not surprising-given that the current version directed players to self-select into the frame that they thought would yield an optimal monetary payoff. After self-selection, we would expect that the Player 1s who chose a particular frame would make more aggressive offers to Player 2 within that frame. Similarly, Player 2s who chose a particular frame could be expected to feel entitled to expect more from Player 1 within that frame.
In interpreting the frame-choice results, it is important to note that the Player 1 and Player 2 findings do not necessarily exhibit the same phenomenon. The structural adjustment that we made affects the two roles differently. When Player 1 is instructed to pick a frame in this revised game, he or she confronts a slightly more complex choice problem, but the basic structure of the game is largely unchanged. It is a sequential, two-move game. In contrast, when giving Player 2 the opportunity to select the game frame, the game takes on a different structure from a conventional ultimatum game. There are now three, rather than two, alternating moves. The task involves more complex processing, particularly for Player 2, and, conceptually, Player 2 now has more power. While results from Larrick and Blount (1997) suggest that Player 1 frame choice is prone to expectational errors about likely Player 2 behavior across frames, it is less clear why Player 2 frame choice exhibits the pattern that it does.
There are several reasons why Player 2 participants might have been expected to pick the more profitable, claim frame more often. First, from a "rational" perspective, Player 1s tend to offer more money in this task. Second, if Player 2s tried to take Player 1's perspective and ask, "If I were Player 1, which frame would I least prefer?" and correctly perceived Player 1's preference, they would pick the claim frame. Yet, our current results suggest that Player 2 participants are not interpreting this task in either of these ways.
There are three possible explanations for why Player 2s preferred the accept/ reject version. First, the more complex Player 2 task may be too unfamiliar, and the experiment is simply picking up random behavior. The task of picking a frame in an artificial game for an anonymous other to make a first offer may simply be too abstract. (Fortunately, while this was a worrisome possibility, our Study 2 and Study 3 results suggest that this was not the case-participants were acting systematically.) Second, our results may demonstrate that, like Player 1, Player 2s may have inaccurate expectations about the next player's moves in this game. They may incorrectly perceive the distribution of Player 1 offers under the different game frames. Finally, these results may indicate that Player 2 motivations are more complex than Player 1s and that we do not understand them completely. In choosing a game frame, a Player 2 may anticipate not only Player 1's likely behaviors, but also his or her own subsequent response. Even though we tried to cue monetary concerns as a motivation, that may not be the only consideration underlying frame preferences. Certainly, findings in domains such as procedural justice (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988) emphasize that procedural preferences are often driven by more than money.
STUDY 2
The purpose of Study 2 was to relax the assumption of profit-maximization as the goal of bargaining. There is a great deal of evidence showing that Player 1 is principally motivated by maximizing profit (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & Sefton, 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, Schachat, & Smith, 1994) . However, Player 2 may have more complicated motivations. Player 2s in the ultimatum bargaining game who receive nonzero, but unequal, offers often reject them in favor of the ($0.00/$0.00) outcome. Thus, their choices are often influenced not only by judgments of profitability, but by a preference for fair outcomes and fair treatment as well as by a desire to punish players who intentionally seek to exploit them (Blount, 1995) . To test for the influence of different motivations, Study 2 varied whether Player 2 participants were told, "your goal for this exercise is to get as large an offer from Player 1 as possible" or were given no goal-related instruction.
The second purpose of Study 2 was to replicate the Player 2 effect from Study 1. The weaker pattern for Player 2 choices in Study 1 raised some doubts about the clarity of the task: Should a group-level preference of 61% be interpreted as reflecting two large groups with different preferences or one large group that is essentially indifferent (or even befuddled)? Moreover, we wanted to test the depth of Player 2's preference by allowing a response of indifference. Thus, participants could choose Game A, Game B, or the option "I'm indifferent. You flip a coin." For economy and simplicity, we moved to a $6 version of the exercise and confined choices to $1 increments.
Method
Participants. One hundred eight MBA students at the University of Chicago participating in a negotiations workshop completed this exercise for real money. They were handed a short questionnaire and given approximately 15 min to complete it. The exercise was then debriefed. Participants were paid outside of class.
Materials. The first page, entitled "Resource Allocation Exercise-Player 2 Role," introduced the exercise and the two game descriptions from Study 1. Half the participants were told that their "goal was to get as large an offer from Player 1 as possible." This phrase was deleted for the other half. For half of the participants in each goal condition, the accept/reject frame was presented as Game A, and for half of the participants, the claim frame was presented as Game A. All participants were then asked, "Which version do you want to play?" and given the choices "Game A," "Game B," or "I'm indifferent. You flip a coin." On page 2, participants made their monetary choices as Player 2, depending on which frame they had chosen. Indifferent choosers were requested to fill-out both response formats.
Results and Discussion
The results replicated Study 1's Player 2 results. As may be seen in Table  1 , half of the participants chose the accept/reject frame, 27% chose the claim frame, and 23% expressed indifference. The low rate of indifference responses indicates that participants were not behaving randomly and did have a preference for frames. Of those who chose a frame, 65% chose accept/reject (versus 50%, binomial z ϭ 2.76, p Ͻ .005). The order of the game descriptions had no effect on choice. These results also show that the presence or absence of explicit profit instructions had little effect on Player 2 preferences. As may be seen in Table 1 , preference for the accept/reject frame was slightly but nonsignificantly stronger under the profit instruction. Although other motivations, such as fairness, may affect frame preferences, relaxing the profit instruction did not change Player 2 behavior in this particular task. It may be that fairness concerns were relatively unimportant; alternatively, it may be that fairness considerations were important, but happened to point in the same direction as profit considerations (at least for some Player 2 participants). Study 3 was designed to test for the importance of alternative frame-choice motivations, such as fairness concerns.
STUDY 3
The purpose of Study 3 was to explore the motivations that might influence frame choice. In Study 1, we imposed the goal of profit maximization. In Study 2, we manipulated this instruction for Player 2 and found a slight but nonsignificant change in frame preference. This result, however, does not speak decisively to Player 2's motivation. It could indicate either a lack of concern with fairness or a concern that happens to lead to the same choice as profit maximization for this task. Thus, Study 3 was designed to explore motivations for both players in the absence of specified goals.
For Player 1, we anticipated that profitability and predictability would be primary motivations (consistent with the expectational findings in Larrick & Blount, 1997, Study 4) . For Player 2, we wanted to examine the extent to which monetary versus other nonmonetary concerns-such as fairness, enjoyment, and respect-might motivate frame choice. To pursue these objectives, we adjusted the task slightly. We again presented the accept/reject and claim versions to participants in the Player 1 and Player 2 positions and instructed them to choose a frame. In this study, however, we did not specify a goal or objective. We simply asked, "Which game do you want to play?" We then included a short questionnaire querying possible motivations.
Method
Participants. Fifty-seven MBA students at the University of Chicago, participating in two different classes on negotiations, voluntarily participated in this exercise. They were handed a three-page questionnaire and given approximately 10 min to complete the exercise. The exercise was debriefed, and money payments were distributed in a subsequent class.
Materials. As with the previous two studies, the first page introduced the exercise and presented the two game versions. On that page, half of the participants were assigned to the Player 1 role and half were assigned to the Player 2 role. After reading the two versions, all participants were asked, "Which version do you want to play-Game A or Game B?" Then, on page 2, they were asked to respond to 14 questions about perceptions and motives. Finally, on page 3, both Player 1 and Player 2 participants made their monetary choices, using elicitation procedures similar to those used in Study 1.
The first seven questions assessed participants' perceptions of the two game descriptions. Participants were asked to respond on a 7-point scale (1 ϭ Game A, 4 ϭ Both the same, 7 ϭ Game B) to each of the following questions: (1) Which version do you feel would be more profitable? (2) Which version do you feel would be more enjoyable? (3) Which version do you feel would be more fair? (4) Which version do you feel would give you more power? (5) In which version do you feel Player 1's [2's] behavior would be more predictable? (6) In which version do you feel you would be treated with more respect? (7) In which version are the roles more similar?
The next seven questions asked participants to reflect on the importance of different factors in their choice of a frame. Here, participants were asked to "Indicate below how important each of these considerations was to making your choice." These included: profitability, enjoyment, fairness, predictability, Note. The higher the score, the more important the choice attribute was rated. ***p Ͻ .001; denotes mean rating differed significantly from 4.05 average. respect, power, and role similarity. Participants were asked to respond on a 7-point scale (1 ϭ Not at all, 7 ϭ A lot). Average requests and acceptable offers. On average, Player 1 participants requested $4.59 when they selected the claim frame and $4.62 when they selected the accept/reject frame (ns). The corresponding minimum acceptable outcomes for Player 2 participants were $2.00 and $2.07 (ns). As in Study 1, these requests were higher than the requests normally observed in the claim and accept/reject frames. Recall that the four corresponding amounts in Study 4 of Larrick and Blount (1997) were $3.83, $4.07, $1.19, and $1.58. As in Study 1, a frame Player ϫ role ϫ frame choice ANOVA confirmed that the amounts requested after choosing a frame (M ϭ 3.32) were significantly higher than the amounts requested after random assignment to a frame (M ϭ 2.67), (F(1, 352) ϭ 12.29, p Ͻ .001). Once again, there were no interactions between frame choice and the other independent variables. Tables 2 and 3 summarize how players reported that various attributes influenced their frame choice. In general, for both roles, ratings of these attributes did not vary by frame choice.
Results

Motivational variables.
1 A 7-point scale was used where 1 indicated "Not at all" and 7 indicated "A lot." The average overall importance rating across attributes was 3.77 for Player 1s and 4.05 for Player 2s. Compared to their average rating, Player 1s rated predictability (M ϭ 5.24, t ϭ 4.086, p Ͻ .001) and profitability (M ϭ 4.69, t ϭ 2.083, p Ͻ .05) as most important and respect (M ϭ 2.69, t ϭ Ϫ3.395, p Ͻ .01) as least important. The attributes of enjoyment, fairness, power, and role similarity were not statistically different from the average rating. For Player 2s, profitability (M ϭ 5.36, t ϭ 3.52, p Ͻ .01) was rated as most important. The other attributes of enjoyment, fairness, power, predictability, respect, and role similarity were not different from the average rating. Across the Player 1 and Player 2 roles, the overall importance ratings were similar and not statistically different, with one exception [F(1, 55) ϭ 4.91, p Ͻ .05]-Player 2s (M ϭ 3.82) cared significantly more about respect than Player 1s (M ϭ 2.69). Tables 4 and 5 show how the two frames were perceived comparatively on the seven attributes. A 7-point rating scale was used for which all responses were recoded, such that 1 ϭ accept/reject frame, 4 ϭ both the same, and 7 ϭ claim frame. For Player 1 participants, perceptions of the two frames varied little regardless of frame choice. Table 4 shows that, on average, all Player 1 participants perceived the accept/reject frame as offering more power, being less fair, and having less role similarity than the claim frame. The only attribute that varied significantly by frame choice was profitability (M ϭ 3.14 for accept/reject choosers, M ϭ 5.25 for claim choosers). These results support the view that Player 1 participants considered only one factor to be Note. A 7-point scale was used with the following scale labels: 1, accept/reject frame; 4, both the same; 7, claim frame.
Descriptive variables.
a Ratings differed significantly with frame choice [F(1, 27) ϭ 5.98, p Ͻ .02); accept/reject (n ϭ 21, M ϭ 3.14, SD ϭ 2.03); claim (n ϭ 8, M ϭ 5.25, SD ϭ 2.19).
* p Ͻ .05, ** p Ͻ .01, *** p Ͻ .001; denotes significantly different from 4.0 indifference point. important-profitability-and made their choice of frame based on this factor alone. Table 5 depicts Player 2s' reported perceptions. Here, perceived profitability also differed by frame choice (M ϭ 2.91 for accept/reject choosers, M ϭ 5.00 for claim choosers), but so did several other variables. Compared to participants who chose the accept/reject frame, participants who chose the claim frame rated it as more enjoyable (M ϭ 5.13 vs M ϭ 3.41) and fair (M ϭ 5.07 vs M ϭ 3.25) and perceived it as offering more respect (M ϭ 5.13 vs M ϭ 2.58) and role similarity (M ϭ 5.40 vs M ϭ 3.25). In addition, there was a marginally significant difference in perceptions of predictability (claim M ϭ 4.00 vs accept/ reject M ϭ 2.67). The games were rated similarly on power, for which Player 2s in both frames perceived that the claim frame had a slight advantage (M ϭ 4.33).
These data suggest that a more complex set of factors may be driving frame choice in the Player 2 role. Perceptions of five characteristics-profitability, enjoyment, fairness, respect, and role similarity-were all associated with frame choice. As Table 6A shows, these perceptions were also highly related to each other (with the exception of profit and respect). Why were they so highly related? One possibility is that fairness may in part be determined by anticipated profitability-the larger Player 2's expected share, the more fair the game is. Another possibility is that fairness may be a means to profitability-the more balanced the roles, the more equal (and profitable) Player 2 expects the outcome. In general, these speculations indicate the difficulty of distinguishing between motivations to make money and motivations to be treated well. Nevertheless, the data clearly suggest that more complicated concerns underlie Player 2s' preferences for frames than Player 1s'. There are several interesting patterns in Table 6 that indicate the presence of two separate motivations. First, as seen in Table 6A , perceptions of profitability and respect are positively but not significantly related. Second, it may be seen in Table 6B that measures of profitability as a choice attribute were not related to measures on the other four factors, but that the importance of receiving respect was related to fairness and enjoyment. Also, recall that Player 2 participants rated respect as more important on average than did Player 1 participants. Thus, a concern with respect may be a separate motivation from a concern with profit. To test this, we conducted a discriminant function analysis predicting frame choice from the five game attributes that were significantly related to frame choice-profitability, respect, fairness, enjoyment, and role similarity. The results confirmed that both profitability [Wilks's ϭ .65, F(1, 25) ϭ 7.15, p Ͻ .05] and respect [Wilks's ϭ .67, F (1, 25) ϭ 5.99, p Ͻ .05] were significant predictors of frame choice.
Discussion
The Study 3 results provide insight into how players choose between frames in a procedural framing task. Even in the absence of specific instructions to maximize profit, participants in both roles reported being highly motivated by profitability. For Player 1, perceptions of profitability were the primary attribute that predicted frame choice. For Player 2, while profitability was named as most important, other factors also appeared to affect frame choice. A discriminant function analysis found that both profit and respect predicted frame choice.
Independent of frame choice, Player 1s reported perceiving the accept/reject frame as offering them significantly more power and the claim frame as offering more similar roles and being more fair. Player 1 participants picked the game that they felt would be most profitable, and directionally but not significantly, those who chose accept/reject also felt that Player 2's behavior would be more predictable.
For Player 2, a wider set of perceptions were aligned with choice. On average, Player 2s reported valuing profitability most and enjoyment least. Yet, the pattern of attribute ratings indicated a more complex set of motivations. For Player 2 participants, perceptions of profit, respect, fairness, enjoyment, and similarity were all related to choice. Although these factors were highly related with each other, a test of all the factors found that respect was a significant predictor even when the other factors were taken into account.
Across studies, Player 2 preferences for the accept/reject frame seem to hover in a range between 45 and 61%. The data from both Studies 2 and 3, however, make it clear that these ratings near 50% do not indicate indifference. When given the opportunity to be indifferent in Study 2, Player 2s seldom took it. Moreover, when asked to indicate their motivations in Study 3, Player 2s perceptions of attributes correlated with their choices: profitability, fairness, respect, enjoyment, and role similarity were all related to choice.
There is some indication that, in the absence of an experimenter-imposed instruction to make as much money as possible, Player 2's preference for the accept/reject frame is weakened. Compared to the significant majority that favored the accept/reject frame in Study 1 (under instruction to maximize their outcome), a slight majority in Study 3 now favored the claim frame. This shift in preference is consistent with the small shift observed between the two instruction conditions in Study 2. Although the change in preference is small, it is suggestive that when multiple concerns are allowed to influence frame choice, considerations such as "receiving respect" may lead some participants to select frames for nonstrategic reasons.
STUDY 4
In Study 4, we wanted to expand our research question. Our goal was to draw from other procedural framing findings in the ultimatum bargaining literature to see if participants could make better frame choices. In this study, we focused only on Player 1 behavior because this frame-choice task changes the structure of the game the least. In designing our tasks, we turned first to the Brewer and Kramer (1986) give versus take finding from the social dilemmas literature. We supplemented it with unpublished data (Wu & Croson, 1998) that documents the give versus take effect in an ultimatum bargaining setting. In research using MBA students at Harvard, Wu and Croson found that when the allocation action was framed as giving back money rather than taking money, players behaved less generously. The take frame is quite similar to the claim frame from Studies 1 and 2; each player independently takes money from a shared pool, totaling $X, such as $6. The give frame is different. At the beginning, each participant is given psychological ownership for the same amount of money $X and then requested to give back some amount, such that the amounts the two players are left with total to $X or less. For example, in the $6 version, each player is told that they have $6 and that the total the players must give back is $6. Past research shows that participants in the give frame are less generous and this leads to more broken deals. This is explained by loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) or the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990) : It is more painful to give up money that one has been endowed with than to forego an equivalent amount that one does not possess. Presumably, when given a choice between give or take, a discerning Player 1 should prefer the take version.
For our second extension, we drew from findings reported by Blount and Bazerman (1996) . In that paper, the authors had participants play an ultimatum bargaining game for $10.00 using only an accept/reject frame, but they varied how Player 2s framed their responses. Specifically, some participants responded by answering a single question "The smallest amount that I will accept is: ." Others responded to multiple questions of the form "Suppose the other student proposed to take $6.00 and give you $4.00: Will you accept the $4.00 or reject and get zero ?" for every possible outcome. This response format is similar to that employed in Studies 1-3 of the current article. Blount and Bazerman (1996) found that Player 2s behaved far more generously toward Player 1 in the multiple-item response format. For example, in their $10 version of the game, the median single-item response for Player 2 was $5.00 compared to $2.50 in the multiple-item response condition. This result was predicted and explained by findings in the behavioral decision literature on single-versus multiple-item preference reversals (Bazerman, Loewenstein, & Blount White, 1992) . Comparative payoffs (and fairness concerns) tend to be more focal in the single-item format, whereas absolute payoffs become more prominent in the multiple-item format.
Drawing from these two findings, we created two new frame-choice tasks: the give/take task and the single-/mulitple-item response task. We again added a third move to the ultimatum bargaining game structure, by giving Player 1 a frame choice prior to determining his or her offer. Previous research indicates that the take and multiple-item response frames maximize Player 1s outcomes and should be preferred.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred eight MBA students at the University of Chicago participating in a negotiations workshop completed this exercise for real money. The data were collected as part of a questionnaire that took approximately 15 min to complete. The exercise was then debriefed. Participants were paid outside of class.
Materials. The final page of the questionnaire was entitled, "Resource Allocation Exercise #2-Player 1 Role." On this page, it was explained to the participants that they would be randomly and anonymously paired with another (different) student to participate in a resource allocation game. In this game, they would be Player 1. The instructions stated that there were two versions of this game, that the participant would get to choose which version he and Player 2 would play, and that Player 2 would not be informed of the choice. Half of the participants were then introduced to the give/take framechoice task. In this task, the "give" frame was explained as follows:
The game begins with a joint pool of $12.00. Each player is then given an allocation of $6.00. For both students to receive a payoff, a total of $6 must be returned to the joint pool. Player 1 goes first and states how much he/she will give back, such as $X. Knowing $X, Player 2 then states how much he/she will give back, let's say $Y. If the total of the two contributions to the joint pool ($X ϩ $Y) equals $6.00 or more, each player gets the amount that he/she has remaining. That means $6 Ϫ X for Player 1 and $6 Ϫ Y for Player 2. If the total is less than $6.00, both students forfeit all of the money.
For the "take" frame, it was explained:
The game begins with a joint pool of $6.00. Each player starts with an allocation of $0.00. For both students to receive a payoff, no more than $6 can be withdrawn from the joint pool. Player 1 goes first and states how much he/she will take, such as $X. Knowing $X, Player 2 then states how much he/she will take, let's say $Y. If the total of the two amounts taken ($X ϩ $Y) equals $6.00 or less, each player gets the amount that he/she took. That means $X for Player 1 and $Y for Player 2. If the total is more than $6.00, both students forfeit all of the money.
Participants then responded using the phrases: " I choose Game A. I will give back $ ," or " I choose Game B. I will take $ ," or " I'm indifferent. You flip a coin. I want $ for me." For half of the give/take participants, the A and B labels were flipped across the give and take games, and the response formats were changed accordingly.
The other half of participants were introduced to the single-/multiple-item frame-choice task. Here, the overall exercise was described using an accept/ reject frame. Then it was explained that in this game, "we make Player 2 state their preferences without knowing your actual offer. We have two ways of doing this. You get to choose which way Player 2 responds." Players were told that Player 2 would not be informed that Player 1 had made a framing choice. They would simply be asked to state a minimum using the response format that Player 1 selected. The response formats were shown as follows:
A: The least that I am willing to accept from Player 1 is $ . (Please answer in $1 increments, e.g., $0, $1, $2, $3) B: If Player 1 proposes:
I will: $6 for Player 1, $0 for you accept $0, reject and get $0 $5 for Player 1, $1 for you accept $1, reject and get $0 $4 for Player 1, $2 for you accept $2, reject and get $0 $3 for Player 1, $3 for you accept $3, reject and get $0
After examining the two formats, participants responded using the phrases: " I choose Response Format A(B). I propose $ for me, $ for Player 2" or " I'm indifferent. You flip a coin. I propose $ for me, $ for Player 2." Again, the labeling of the two response formats was reversed for half of the give/take participants.
Results and Discussion
Fifty-five participants completed the give/take frame-choice task and 53 completed the single-/multiple-item response task. These results are shown in Table 7 . Eight (15%) give/take and nine (16%) single-/multiple-item participants expressed indifference across the frames. Of those who chose a frame, only 20 (43%) give/take participants chose the advantageous take frame, and 24 (53%) single-/multiple-item participants chose the advantageous multiple-item frame. Neither of these effects was significantly different from 50%. As in Studies 1 and 3, Player 1s did not correctly identify the most advantageous frame. However, unlike participants in Studies 1 and 3, participants in these conditions did not appear to favor the wrong frame.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this article, our objective was to examine framing as a dependent variable in interpersonal bargaining-a behavioral choice that a bargainer can make in addition to determining his or her offer. To simplify the task, we selected a very specific setting: a distributive game with two players and two moves, where consistent between-participant framing effects had been identified in past research. We used these results as a starting point for the current research question-how well do people select among alternative frames? In Studies 1 through 3, we examined one frame-choice task in detail. In Study 4, to expand external validity, we examined two other established framing effects. Across all four studies, we never observed a significant majority of participants choosing the more advantageous frame and frequently observed a significant majority choosing the disadvantageous frame. Thus, these results found that in the ultimatum bargaining context, negotiators are not typically successful at using framing opportunities to their advantage. This finding raises many interesting questions, most importantly, why do negotiators not perform well?
Our results suggest that the tendency toward suboptimality in frame choice may be due to two factors: (a) nonmonetary motivations, such as fairness and respect, that influence frame-choice preferences away from the optimal, profitmaximizing choice; and (b) cognitive limitations that inhibit the bargainer's ability to correctly perceive the effect of alternative frames on opponents' responses and thus lead to suboptimal frame choice. Below, we briefly review both of these interpretations.
Monetary versus Nonmonetary Motivations in Frame Choice
When making a frame choice, bargainers may be motivated by monetary and nonmonetary concerns. Frames that maximize monetary goals may not simultaneously maximize nonmonetary goals. If nonmonetary goals prevail, suboptimal behavior will be observed. While Player 1s typically reported being motivated primarily by profits, Player 2s provided evidence of more complex preference structures. While profitability was the highest rated Player 2 goal, issues of respect, fairness, enjoyment, and role similarity also appeared to influence frame choice and were correlated with profitability judgments. Further, respect was significantly more important to Player 2s than Player 1s and independently predicted Player 2 frame choice. Together, these findings suggest that Player 2 frame-choice behavior was motivated by both nonmonetary and monetary goals.
These findings are consistent with previous studies in the ultimatum game literature which have found that participants, particularly those in the Player 2 position, frequently choose outcomes that reflect a concern for fairness . The current findings extend those results. Just as participants pursue nonmonetary goals when making choices about distributive outcomes, our results suggest that they also pursue nonmonetary goals when making choices about allocation procedures. The importance of these concerns indicates that constructs in other areas of social psychology-particularly determinants of procedural fairness in dispute resolution (Lind & Tyler, 1988 )-may be an important determinant of frame choice in bargaining.
Our analysis further suggests that respect may form a separate motivation from fairness, particularly for bargainers in weak power positions. Respect has not been systematically studied in the bargaining literature (one recent exception is Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, & Weinblatt, 1999) . As with fairness, preliminary evidence suggests that respect may affect how both outcomes and procedures are evaluated. It is our sense that respect involves norms of behavioral deference-where the independence of the focal individual, and his or her standing as a fellow human being, is acknowledged by the other party. It may be particularly important in low-power role situations where the range of choices available to the bargainer is severely limited. Thus, both the nature of those low-power outcomes, and how they are enacted, takes on deeper meaning. For example, distributively, the motivation of respect may explain why Player 2s in a $7 version of the ultimatum bargaining game are sometimes willing to take $1.00 or $1.50, but not $0.50 (i.e., the possible lowest outcome). Neither outcome yields equality, but, perhaps, $1.50 is interpreted as communicating more respect. It leaves more for Player 2 than just the "crumbs." Alternatively, one can imagine a bargainer participating in a protracted, real-world negotiation, who feels forced to make a painful concession. The idea of framing that concession as something that he has voluntarily offered up in the interests of the relationship may be seen as a far more attractive frame than one in which he was forced by the other party into making a major concession. In either case, the size of the concession may be the same, but we can imagine that the first frame-choice would be more highly valued. It allows the weaker bargainer to save face and appear generous. As these examples suggest, respect as a motivation may related to, or encompass, needs for strategic self-presentation (Jones & Pittman, 1982) , impression management (Schlenker, 1980; Snyder, 1977) , and maintaining self-image (Steele, 1988) .
Cognitive Limitations in Frame Choice
While the role of nonmonetary concerns may provide a reasonable explanation for Player 2's suboptimal frame-choice behavior, our process data do not support such an explanation for Player 1. Across three different framing domains, Player 1s, who reported being primarily profit motivated, consistently picked suboptimally. The leading alternative conclusion, therefore, is that bargainers are limited in their ability to discern the optimal frame. In one sense, it could be argued that framing effects should be difficult to recognize because to even be found their influence on behavior must be difficult to detect. Yet, the current findings are still curious. The frame-choice tasks presented the bargainer with both frames. The direct comparison across frames should have made critical features salient. All the bargainer needed to do was simulate his or her own behavior by asking "How much would I ask for here?" and use that information to make a choice. Given the ample availability of information and the opportunity to use his or her own introspections, why did bargainers not choose well in our studies? We think there are several obstacles to optimal frame choice, which we outline below.
Frame transparency and frame interference. In the frame-choice task, we present bargainers with two or more procedural frames. On the positive side, this process allows the bargainer to "see through" the surface details of each frame, examine the underlying structure, and consider how best to pose the task to the other bargainer. On the negative side, this transparency may lead bargainers to view the frames as identical, make them confused, and lead them to behave randomly. In the frame-choice tasks studied here, we found little evidence for indifference. However, to the extent that bargainers showed no significant preferences in Study 4, they may have been choosing randomly between the give versus take frames and the single-versus multiple-item frames.
Frame transparency may be a problem when participants are presented with multiple frames; however, a related effect may occur when bargainers try to generate alternative frames themselves. Once a person conceives a first frame, such as "giving back to a common pool," that frame might bias or pollute the bargainer when he/she tries to imagine an alternative frame. Thus, the bargainer may experience interference from the first frame when he/she tries to imagine alternative descriptions. For example, imagine a department chair who must allocate a new resource, such as access to new laboratory space, for which demand is expected to increase. The chair may originally think of giving each department member an initial share of laboratory time and then requesting people to relinquish resources when there are shortages. The chair may try to generate alternative procedures on the same theme-allocating hours in the lab and then asking department members to "contribute lab time back to the department" or "donate lab time to new faculty"-rather than seeing the alternative possibility of framing lab access as "taking lab time" from a common pool. (We trust that experience in allocating scarce resources makes department chairs wise to this framing effect and immune to the rookie mistake described here! We return to the role of experience at the end of this section.)
Simulation failure. A second reason bargainers may choose suboptimal frames is that they fail to simulate their opponent's response under different frames. It may be that bargainers do not recognize that simulation is a useful strategy, or they may decide that imagining their opponent's behavior is too effortful and difficult. In the absence of simulation, they may rely on naïve theories to predict behavior (which we discuss in the next section), or they may simply choose randomly (as in Study 4).
Of more interest is the possibility that, even if bargainers do simulate their opponent's behavior, they do it poorly. Perhaps the most efficient strategy for simulating an opponent's behavior is to imagine one's own behavior in the same circumstance (Dawes, 1990) . But even this strategy may fail to the extent that people's actual, current circumstances cloud their ability to imagine hypothetical situations (Loewenstein, 1995) . In ultimatum games, for example, Player 1s tend to view the game as a competition and focus on the power advantages of their position. When they simulate Player 2's response, they may underestimate the role that fairness judgments play in Player 2's actual response (Murnighan & Pillutla, 1995) .
Further, even if bargainers conduct accurate simulations, they may not use them in choosing frames. Consider several experiments in which participants made decisions as Player 2 before making decisions as Player 1 (Larrick & Blount, 1997) . Note that in these experiments, bargainers did not have to imagine what they would do as Player 2. They merely had to recall their own behavior from minutes before. Despite this prior experience, participants in the claiming frame generated offers that were much more generous than they themselves required as Player 2. Moreover, their responses in the two roles were only weakly correlated. These results show that even when bargainers have their own behavior as a proxy for the opposing role's response, they do not reliably use it to select a frame. Why would bargainers largely ignore their own experience? We suspect that even vivid simulations might be neglected if bargainers have other strong expectations for their opponent's behavior. One source of such expectations are what we term "naïve theories."
Incorrect naïve theories. Beyond simulating their opponent's behavior, bargainers also apply theories about how bargaining situations affect behavior (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987) . The details of a bargaining frame call attention to specific features and evoke specific interpretations (Allison, Beggan, & Midgely, 1996) that guide frame choice. For example, bargainers may hold theories about what gives them power or what makes an opponent generous. These "naïve" theories will often be correct, but not always. In the current research, we drew from Larrick and Blount (1997, Study 4) to conjecture that Player 1s have a faulty theory about bargaining power: They believe that constraining Player 2's decision to accept or reject gives them greater control than the openended claim response. Anecdotal responses in Study 1 and systematic attribute ratings in Study 3 provide support that Player 1s hold this belief. Although restricting control may have advantages in many situations, in this instance it does not. The weak preference for the give frame in Study 4 may also reflect an incorrect naïve theory. Several subjects reported selecting the give frame because it started out with more money (i.e., $12 instead of $6), which they thought might make the other party feel more generous. This theory is plausible and might hold in many situations, but it does not predict behavior in this context.
Because there are many sources of incorrect naïve theories-e.g., inductive learning, cultural norms, stereotypes-an exhaustive taxonomy of their causes and content does not exist. Better understood is that a handful of cognitive and social processes makes it difficult to correct incorrect theories (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Jones, 1990; Nisbett & Ross, 1980) . For example, incorrect theories about bargaining frames may be quite durable if there is little or no feedback on the effectiveness of alternative frames.
The Role of Experience and Context in Frame Choice
In sum, there are at least three types of cognitive limitations that may lead to poor frame choice in bargaining: frame transparency and interference, simulation failure, and incorrect naïve theories. However, it should be noted that these tendencies do not imply that frame choice is necessarily poor. It would be interesting to study other documented framing effects as dependent variables to see if they also result in suboptimal frame-choice behavior. There may be some content domains in which bargainers may naturally simulate how to correctly frame procedures and outcomes to maximize payoffs. For example, Hamilton (1999) reports preliminary evidence from a marketing domain which finds that people are able to correctly choose, from among alternative procedures, that procedural frame which utilizes the compromise effect (Simonson & Tversky, 1992) .
It is also possible that there are some contexts in which correct naïve theories can be learned. Repeated interactions may provide the necessary feedback and learning opportunities required to experiment with alternative frames, gauge success or failure, and adjust behavior accordingly. With parents, spouses, bosses, and children, we suspect that most people learn over time how to differentially frame requests so as to maximize desired results. Within organizational settings, employees observe over time the kinds of budgetary requests that typically get funded, and those that get rejected. Successful employees learn how to frame their budgetary requests to most resemble these culturally reinforced norms. Thus, successful frame choice may be a function of context and experience.
Responders' Beliefs about Intention in Frame Choice
The question of how and when people proactively use framing in negotiation introduces an important, related question: do other players typically know when the opponent is seeking to frame the interaction? If they do know, what effect does that knowledge have on the responder's subsequent cognitions and behavior? Our sense is that many existing framing findings should be revisited in this light.
In traditional framing studies, participants passively receive information from an experimenter and respond to it. However, once someone knows that an opponent negotiator, rather than a neutral experimenter, is actively managing how and what is communicated, suspicion and more complex processing may be invoked. We have informally observed in teaching negotiations that when a self-interested negotiation opponent is known to have crafted an offer, bargainers attend to the details of framing more carefully. They think more suspiciously, they spontaneously counterargue, and they generate rival frames. We conjecture that by provoking critical reflection and spontaneous reframing, suspicious thinking may reduce the magnitude of several well-know decision biases, such as anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and gain-loss framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) . However, it may also exacerbate some of the self-oriented biases, such as the fixed-pie bias and self-serving interpretations of fairness (Babcock, 1995; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) . It would be interesting in future studies to test how alternative attributions about who crafted a "framed" offer might influence how bargainers interpret and respond to the same offers across frames. We have evidence from the current article that giving players a choice to frame the game leads them to behave more aggressively than players who are simply given an assigned game frame. It would be interesting to find out if those who believe that they are receiving a "framed" offer show the same tendency.
Frame Choice and Bargaining Efficiency
One final implication of frame choice is that it appears to increase the demands of bargainers (compared to bargainers who are assigned a frame), thereby decreasing the percentage of deals that are successfully completed. We explained this effect in Studies 1 and 3 as being the result of self-selection: Bargainers are cherry-picking the frame they believe is most advantageous, and then try to exploit it. Of course, their confidence in asking for more seems unjustified given their poor ability to choose more profitable frames! These results suggest a general, but still tentative, implication: Bargainers who have more control over framing the bargaining procedure will be more aggressive in making demands. As research in negotiation moves toward the study of how bargainers choose frames, it bears watching whether choice-induced confidence reduces bargaining efficiency.
Conclusion
Most studies of framing in negotiations focus on understanding how bargainers react to alternative frames. Few studies examine how bargainers proactively frame information for others. The current research differs from earlier social and cognitive psychological research by studying prospective frame choice. Yet it examines only a small slice of the complex process of bargainer frame communication-a single-issue, two-stage, distributive negotiation in which there was no face-to-face interaction. The frame-choice task itself involved only two, fixed alternatives. To enhance external validity, future studies will need to permit open-ended frame construction and, ultimately, to go beyond the exchange of written information to include face-to-face interaction, symbolic acts, physical gestures, and vocal overtones (Chatman, Putnam, & Sondak, 1991; Simons, 1974) .
In addition, future studies should more deeply examine alternative framing motivations behind frame choice. Here, we focused on how framing can be used to influence the generosity that one elicits from another bargainer. However, our findings suggest that nonmonetary motivations may also influence frame choice. Theoretically, frame choice could also be used to achieve a number of social motivations, such as impression management and affiliation.
In sum, the current research provides a first step in the study of frame choice-how alternative procedural frames are processed and selected by bargainers to affect how other bargainers respond. By providing bargainers with a choice of frames in a well-defined setting, we identified a tractable method for studying framing processes in negotiations. The initial evidence indicates that bargainers perform poorly at finding the most profitable frames in the ultimatum bargaining task and that motivations other than profitability may influence frame choice. Future research can help address the generality of these findings as well as their causes and consequences. We conclude by suggesting that how alternative procedural and outcome frames are generated and selected should be a central question in the future psychological study of bargaining.
